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INTRODUCTION 
This Childress Lecture, devoted to contemporary justice systems and 
stimulated by Judith Resnik’s focus on “Invention and Challenges in 
Democratic Courts,” invites us to think about experiments in adjudication and 
implications for democratic government.  Such a Symposium very 
appropriately includes a panel on military tribunals.  Since the turn of this 
century, few areas of adjudication have been the site of as much expansion and 
innovation as tribunals operating within the domain of national security.  It is 
time to review contemporary practice and to clear a way forward. 
My assessment of military tribunals in contemporary practice is based on 
several premises.  The first is that war against an untraditional non-state 
actor—an adversary not bound by the territorial ties of statehood yet still 
exercising globally—posed a special challenge in containment.  The second is 
that detention became one of many practices the United States developed to 
contain such an adversary.  The third is that tribunals became a key institution 
in practices of detention, integral to the emerging national security assemblage.  
In tribunals, the U.S. government has projected institutions of justice into the 
theater of combat and adapted their forms, practices, and conventions to the 
demands of war.  This Article seeks to reflect on the decade of fraught 
experimentation the United States has conducted in using tribunals for a war 
against a non-state foe. 
I write for two audiences.  One audience is the current-day public and the 
decision-makers who are still dealing with the “mess” of detentions,1 including 
169 remaining detainees at the Guantánamo Bay facilities,2 more at Bagram 
Air Force Base facilities in Afghanistan,3 and a fraught legacy of policies and 
case-law precedents.  The second audience to whom this Article is addressed is 
a future public who may have to grapple with other adversaries or with future 
 
 1. Referring to the jumble of policy justifications, ad hoc decision-making, extensions of 
executive power, and bodies and lives interned at Guantánamo that he inherited from his 
predecessor—specifically the 240 detainees that sat in Guantánamo detention when his 
Administration took office—President Obama diagnosed the problem in just those words, as “a 
mess.”  President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security  (May 21, 2009) 
[hereinafter President’s National Archives Speech], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_ 
press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-Security-5-21-09/ (“We’re cleaning up 
something that is, quite simply, a mess . . . .”). 
 2. The Guantánamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo (last 
updated Apr. 19, 2012). 
 3. Detainees in Afghanistan were scattered among different facilities until U.S. forces 
consolidated theater detention operations at Bagram Air Force Base.  See Matthew C. Waxman, 
The Law of Armed Conflict and Detention Operations in Afghanistan, in 85 INTERNATIONAL 
LAW STUDIES, THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 343, 344 (Michael N. Schmitt 
ed., 2009).  As of March 10, 2012, the United States reportedly held 3200 detainees at the 
Bagram facility.  Rod Nordland, U.S. and Afghanistan Agree on Prisoner Transfer as Part of 
Long-Term Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2012, at A8. 
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flexing of U.S. executive power.  This Article is primarily addressed to the 
latter.  It requests present readers to step out of the frame of what today seems 
endless conflict, war without end, and to imagine what today seems hard to 
imagine: imagine it’s over.  Imagine peace.  Imagine the Administration has 
declared the war against al Qaeda and its affiliates over.  As we reflect on 
military tribunals and experiments, I want to take up that reflection from the 
imagined standpoint of the day after.  This Article is composed as a letter to 
the future, a future not spent in indefinite war but in peace. 
The situation that tribunals are meant to remediate remains a mess, 
notwithstanding years of effort at getting them right.  One stumbling block that 
I identify is that the standard understanding of military tribunals is inadequate 
for U.S. practice since 9/11.  That inadequate understanding has short-circuited 
reform attempts.  To address this shortcoming, in this Article I propose a 
broader definition of military tribunal to account for the diversity of U.S. 
government practice in the “war on terror.”  (That is why, although the 
Childress Lecture designated our panel as a “Military Commissions” panel, I 
write instead about tribunals more broadly.)  A second goal is to put forth some 
proposals for innovation in law and policy that use tribunals to manage a 
variety of forms of detention.  This Article is motivated by my concerned 
observation that those in the U.S. legal community have at times been talking 
passed those working in national security after September 2001.  Without 
trying to anticipate the outcome of ongoing legislative or diplomatic 
deliberations,4 this Article seeks to address part of the gap between legal 
 
 4. As this Article goes to press, Congress has reformed the law governing detention in 
armed conflicts which takes tribunals as a mode of intervention.  National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011).  A concerted attempt was 
made to keep prosecution of war-on-terror suspects out of U.S. federal courts.  See National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. 1540, 112th Cong. § 1039 (as passed by 
House, May 26, 2011) (restricting the Executive from prosecuting detainees in U.S. federal 
courts); id. § 1036 (substituting a new system of review for the system established by the 
President’s March 7, 2011 Executive Order); id. § 1040 (restricting transfers of detainees to 
foreign countries).  President Obama’s senior staff promised to recommend a veto if a final bill 
presented to the President for his signature contained those provisions.  OFFICE OF MGMT. & 
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY, H.R. 
1540 – NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FY 2012, at 2–3 (2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/112/saphr1540r_20110524.pdf.  
Congress amended some of the proposed provisions and dropped the requirements contained in 
sections 1036 and 1039.  See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. 
No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011).  The President did, in the end, sign the bill in order to approve 
defense appropriations, but with his signature he issued a “signing statement” expressing the 
Administration’s reservations to provisions regarding detainee treatment.  Presidential Statement 
on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 2011 DAILY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 978, at 1 (Dec. 31, 2011) (explaining that the President signed the bill in order to 
appropriate funds for military operations “despite having serious reservations with certain 
provisions that regulate the detention, interrogation, and prosecution of suspected terrorists”).  
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practitioners and national security practitioners and to contribute to present and 
future decisions regarding tribunals used in the conduct of war.  As a matter of 
method, the proposals I urge are based on observation of state practice, in order 
to account for national security motivations that currently drive policy, on the 
assumption that reforms acknowledging the diverse motivations that bring 
agents of an executive power to detain are more apt to meet with compliance. 
The Article will proceed through the following steps.  Part I summarizes 
some of the ways that the pre-existing conceptualizations of military tribunals 
fall short.  Part II relates some of the legal contours of the present context and 
describes some of the tribunals actually operating therein.  First, it lays out the 
definitional distinctions international law provides between international and 
non-international armed conflict and some of the consequences of those 
classifications.  It then gives some description of tribunals operating within a 
variety of forms of detention in the national security context, suggesting that 
expanding the context under consideration allows for critique and reform of 
tribunals beyond formally constituted military commissions.  Part III calls for 
release of detainees held in preventive detention at the cessation of hostilities 
and makes a few modest concluding proposals, based on recent experience, in 
regard to the work of tribunals in three forms of detention outlined in Part II. 
I.  TOWARDS A MORE ENCOMPASSING DEFINITION OF TRIBUNALS 
A. The Inadequacy of Current Conceptualizations 
Legal experts who have worked to influence U.S. government conduct in 
the “war on terror” have been informed by a baseline understanding that 
military tribunals exist to try suspects for violations of martial law and the laws 
of war.5  That definition of a tribunal revolves around a function—to conduct a 
 
The Administration subsequently reiterated those objections and reasserted executive authority to 
try terrorism suspects in Article III courts.  See Presidential Policy Directive on Procedures 
Implementing Section 1022 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 
2012 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 136, at 4 (Feb. 28, 2012).  On a parallel track, this Article goes to 
press as states party to the Geneva Conventions concluded their quadrennial review, which 
included detention on the agenda.  See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, STRENGTHENING 
LEGAL PROTECTION FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 8–12 (2011), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-movement/31st-international-conference/ 
31-int-conference-strengthening-legal-protection-11-5-1-1-en.pdf. 
 5. This standard definition is found in a wide variety of sources.  See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1082 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “military commission” as “[a] court, usu. composed 
of both civilians and military officers, that is modeled after a court-martial and that tries and 
decides cases concerning martial-law violations”); see also Myron C. Cramer, Military 
Commissions, Trial of the Eight Saboteurs, 17 WASH. L. REV. & ST. B. J. 247, 248 (1942) 
(“Military Commissions are primarily war courts.  They may sit in conquered territory . . . or, in 
domestic territory over which, because of war conditions, we have taken military control . . . .  
They may also sit and try cases for violations of the law of war.”). 
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trial.  It assumes two definitional qualities about the person who is the object of 
the trial process: he is 1) one suspected of violating martial law or the law of 
war, who is 2) in custody of a state party to a conflict. 
Work on military tribunals, their reform, or their abolition, accordingly, 
has largely been confined to reflecting on the military commission system set 
up to try detainees at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.  Legal action pursued by U.S. 
civilian and military lawyers in U.S. courts on behalf of detainees has focused 
on getting the military commissions process right: on securing federal 
jurisdiction for detainees at Guantánamo,6 on re-securing federal habeas 
jurisdiction over Guantánamo,7 and on filing habeas petitions for detainees at 
Guantánamo8 or refining the military commissions before whom charged 
detainees would appear to ensure a modicum of due process.9  Lawyers have 
 
 6. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480–81 (2004) (holding that the U.S. federal 
courts have habeas jurisdiction over foreign nationals held at the U.S. Navy facility at 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, under the authority of federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241), superseded by 
statute, Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739. 
 7. After Supreme Court stipulations in Rasul v. Bush, id., were superseded by the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739, habeas jurisdiction was re-clarified 
in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (holding that petitioners, Guantánamo 
detainees, had a constitutional right to habeas review). 
 8. For background, see generally JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL 33180, ENEMY COMBATANT DETAINEES:  HABEAS CORPUS CHALLENGES 
IN FEDERAL COURT 37–38 (2010).  For a sample of habeas petitions filed, see, for example, 
Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 402 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (reversing the district court’s judgment 
and denying Uthman’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus); Bacha v. Obama, 653 F. Supp. 2d 32, 
33 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting the case was for habeas relief of a Guantánamo Bay detainee); Al Ginco 
v. Obama, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123, 124–25, 130 (D.D.C. 2009) (granting the habeas petition of 
Guantánamo Bay detainee Abdulrahim Abdul Razak Al Ginco); Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 
2d 51, 52 (D.D.C. 2009) (granting the habeas petition of Guantánamo Bay detainee Alia Ali Bin 
Ali Ahmed); Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 31 (D.D.C. 2009) (explaining the reasons 
the court granted Basardh habeas relief at his previous hearing); Hammamy v. Obama, 604 F. 
Supp. 2d 240, 244 (D.D.C. 2009) (denying the habeas petition of Guantánamo Bay detainee Hedi 
Hammamy); Al-Adahi v. Obama, 597 F. Supp. 2d 38, 40–41 (D.D.C. 2009) (considering three 
case management order provisions in habeas cases for Guantánamo Bay detainees); el Gharani v 
Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 144, 149 (D.D.C. 2009) (granting the habeas petition of Guantánamo Bay 
detainee Mohammed el Gharani); Al Alwi v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 24, 29 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(denying the habeas petition of Guantánamo Bay detainee Moath Hamza Ahmed Al Alwi); Sliti 
v. Bush, 592 F. Supp. 2d 46, 51 (D.D.C. 2008) (denying the habeas petition of Guantánamo Bay 
detainee Hisham Sliti); Al Bihani v. Bush,  588 F. Supp. 2d 19, 20 (D.D.C. 2008) (ordering the 
procedure that would govern the habeas corpus proceedings of Guantánamo Bay detainee Ghaleb 
Nassar Al Bihani). 
 9. See, e.g., Lebron v. Rumsfeld, No. 11-6480, 2012 WL 213352, at *8–9 (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 
2012) (noting Congress’s “active engage[ment] with . . . what process was due enemy combatant 
detainees”); see also Faiza W. Sayed, Challenging Detention: Why Immigrant Detainees Receive 
Less Process than “Enemy Combatants” and Why They Deserve More, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 
1833, 1844–48 (2011) (discussing the “active back and forth discussion between the Executive, 
Congress, and the Courts” regarding detainee rights).  See generally Nicholas Stephanopoulos, 
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scored some significant successes in particular cases,10 but overall their narrow 
conceptualization of tribunals has limited the scope of their reform efforts and 
reduced the relevance for practitioners and policymakers. 
The starting observation my research yields is that the U.S. executive 
branch has in fact produced different tribunals to generate and deal with 
different kinds of detainees in the current conflict.  Each tribunal may serve 
multiple functions or different tribunals may operate simultaneously, serving 
different functions in regard to the same person.11  Thus, the apparently simple 
statement that a tribunal exists to ascertain guilt or innocence of a detained 
suspect belies a much more complicated reality.  For clarity, I propose that 
executive branch authorities in the United States practice at least three different 
modes of detention in the “war on terror.”  In the first detention context, which 
I refer to as “criminal detention,” authorities may conduct an investigation, 
assess possible culpability, and hold a suspect for trial.  The current 
conceptualization of “tribunal” applies only to the criminal detention context, 
and even then, only to a subset of adjudication within it.  The second and third 
modes of detention are both practiced within the frame of “national security 
detention,” which may be for one of two purposes: 1) to stop a combatant from 
returning to the battlefield, a suspected accomplice from aiding terrorism, or a 
suspected terrorist from committing acts of terrorism (preventive detention) or 
2) to question a possible informant (interrogative detention).  As my catalogue 
of some of the tribunals the United States has used in the hostilities against al-
Qaeda will demonstrate, not all military tribunals exist “to try” a suspect, in the 
sense of ascertaining guilt or innocence through an adversarial process in order 
to sentence the guilty or free the innocent.  Some current tribunals do not take 
“the accused” as their object.  This Article focuses on all those tribunals that 
take “the detainee,” who may or may not be accused, as their object. 
Historically, criminal detention and national security detention have 
intersected when national security detainees have been subject to trial for 
possible culpability as war criminals, often after hostilities have ceased.12  
 
Comment, Solving the Due Process Problem with Military Commissions, 114 YALE L.J. 921 
(2005) (discussing looming constitutional issues with “the due process problem” in military 
commissions). 
 10. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 6–7. 
 11. See Brian C. Baldrate, The Supreme Court’s Role in Defining the Jurisdiction of Military 
Tribunals: A Study, Critique, & Proposal for Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 186 MIL. L. REV. 1, 9–10 
(2005) (discussing the overlapping purposes of military tribunals). 
 12. See, for example, the Nuremberg trials of Nazi officers and officials, recorded in TRIAL 
OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL (1947) 
(publishing the trials of the major German war criminals, tried after the cessation of German 
hostilities) or the Tokyo trials of Japanese imperial officials, recorded in United States v. Araki, 
Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Nov. 4–12, 1948), reprinted in 1 
THE TOKYO JUDGMENT: THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST 
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“Trial,” typically reserved for criminal detainees, is used when national 
security detainees (either prisoners of war (“POWs”) or enemy combatants) 
become subject to assessment for crimes against the laws of war.13  Courts or 
military commissions, then, adjudicate cases of those subject to criminal 
detention, or the subset of instances when those subject to national security 
detention have been charged with war crimes.14 
Efforts to create, reform, or abolish military tribunals have focused almost 
exclusively on formally constituted bodies trying suspects held in criminal 
detention.  This narrow framing of the discussion of military tribunals, I 
propose, misses most of the action related to the U.S. government’s practices 
in the “war on terror.”  Measured by numbers of detainees, most deliberation 
and decision-making has happened without any connection to the military 
commissions system.  Seven hundred and seventy-nine detainees are known to 
have been sent to Guantánamo since 2002.15  Of those, 730 have not (and, 
barring a change in policy, will never) face a military commission.  This figure 
is extrapolated from the following: Under both the Bush and Obama 
Administrations, military commissions have dealt with only sixteen detainees, 
convicting seven, charging six more, and sentencing three who plead guilty.16  
Obama Administration tribunals have designated thirty-six detainees as 
eligible for trial before the military commission (including three who have 
pleaded guilty and have already been sentenced by the military commission).17  
In sum, barring a change of policy by a future Administration, under the most 
expansive scenario by current plans the military commissions will have dealt 
with approximately forty-nine of a known Guantánamo detainee population of 
779.  Furthermore, these numbers do not include the over 3,000 detainees held 
over ten years of conflict at the Bagram Theater Internment Facility at a U.S. 
Air Force base in Afghanistan (now succeeded by the newly built nearby 
Parwan facility, which is still commonly referred to as the Bagram facility).18  
None of the Bagram detainees have had a hearing before a formal military 
 
(I.M.T.F.E.) 29 APRIL 1946 - 12 NOVEMBER 1948 (B.V.A. Röling & C.F. Rüter eds., 1977) 
(indicting and trying Japanese officials after Japan’s surrender).  But see Ex parte Quirin, 317 
U.S. 1 (1942) for a military commission that operated while hostilities were ongoing. 
 13. See, e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 11 (1946). 
 14. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31 (describing that those detained are subject to 
adjudication by military tribunals). 
 15. The Guantánamo Docket, supra note 2. 
 16. By the Numbers, MIAMI HERALD, http://www.miamiherald.com/2007/11/27/322461/by-
the-numbers.html (last updated Apr. 24, 2012). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Andy Worthington, Bagram: Graveyard of the Geneva Conventions, ANDY 
WORTHINGTON (May 2, 2010), http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2010/02/05/bagram-grave 
yard-of-the-geneva-conventions/. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1160 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:1153 
commission.19  As this summary shows, narrow consideration of military 
commissions covers only a fraction of the total detainees considered by some 
U.S. tribunal. 
Framing discussion of military tribunals by the narrow category of 
formally constituted courts and military commissions not only misses most 
detainees held by the United States, it also excludes the majority of tribunals 
that have overseen review of continued detention or decided detainees’ initial 
detention.  It excludes tribunals set up to review cases of those already 
detained: the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (“CSRTs”)20 that the Bush 
Administration set up in response to the Supreme Court’s rebuke of the 
military commissions process in Rasul and Hamdi;21 the Task Force for 
reviewing each of those detained at Guantánamo that the Obama 
Administration put in place when it took office;22 the Periodic Review Boards 
(“PRBs”) that the Obama Administration set up to ensure regular review of 
continued detention at Guantánamo;23 or the Detainee Review Boards at 
Bagram.  A narrow framing around formally constituted commissions also 
leaves out the bodies that select individuals for detention.  For example, it 
excludes those military screening teams that scoured Northern Alliance prisons 
after the United States and allies commenced military action in Afghanistan 
against the Taliban beginning in October 2001, teams tasked with locating and 
taking into U.S. custody possible sources of intelligence regarding the threat 
posed by al Qaeda or useful for planning military actions against al Qaeda and 
the Taliban.24  More generally, treating tribunals as synonymous with formal 
 
 19. Bagram Detainee Transfers Would Strengthen Broader Military Mission in Afghanistan, 
HUM. RTS. FIRST (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2012/01/24/bagram-detainee-
transfers-would-strengthen-broader-military-mission-in-afghanistan/.  The U.S. military 
established procedures under which the grounds for a person’s detention at Bagram [Parwan] is 
reviewed within sixty days of his arrival at the detention center and re-reviewed every sixty days 
thereafter.  Lisa Daniel, Task Force Ensures Fair Detainee Treatment, Commander Says, U.S. 
DEP’T OF DEF. (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=103004.  The 
review is conducted without lawyers or judges by a three-person panel of U.S. military officers.  
See Seth Doane & Phil Hirschkorn, Bagram: The Other Guantanamo?, CBS NEWS (Nov. 15, 
2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-57323856/bagram-the-other-guantanamo/ 
(noting the three-officer review panel for Bagram detainees). 
 20. Combatant Status Review Tribunals, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. 1 (Sept. 26, 2006), 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2006/d20061017CSRT.pdf. 
 21. Id.; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 570 (2006), superseded by statute, 
Military Commission Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. 
 22. Exec. Order No. 13,493, 3 C.F.R. 207 (2009) (creating the Special Interagency Task 
Force on Detainee Disposition); see also President’s National Archives Speech, supra note 1 
(describing the process of dealing with detainees at Guantánamo). 
 23. Exec. Order No. 13,567, 74 Fed. Reg. 13,277 (2011). 
 24. See Declaration of Michael H. Mobbs, Exhibit 1 Attached to Respondents’ Response to, 
and Motion to Dismiss, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus ¶¶ 3–5, 8–9 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
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military commissions ignores the fora and processes by which the executive 
branch generates and manages detention beyond the narrow category of 
criminal detention. 
B. Proposal for Expanded Consideration of Tribunals 
I propose an expanded conception of a military tribunal.  Instead of a 
narrow focus on a body that conducts trials, this expanded conception would 
encompass the basic function25 that all of the tribunals used by the United 
States in the “war on terror” have served, namely, to process detainees.  By 
“processing” detainees, I mean, basically, “to sort.”  (I describe processing as 
“sorting” to indicate something potentially different than “trying.”)  This 
discussion, then, will cover not just military commissions formally constituted, 
but the range of tribunals we have deployed to sort out this “mess.”26  Working 
from a functional approach to defining, I consider a “military tribunal” to 
include any body convened to consider known facts, within categories preset 
by law or policy, to decide the disposition of a particular person in the context 
of the United States’ war against al Qaeda and its allies. 
There are several common attributes of the tribunals I take up in this 
analysis.  Most obviously, they have in common their object, i.e., on whom 
they are working: those deprived of liberty and held by the U.S. government in 
the conflict against al Qaeda and its allies.27  These tribunals also have in 
common their agents, employees of the U.S. executive branch.  Like the formal 
military commissions, these tribunals are not necessarily creatures of the 
judicial branch and do not reflect a three-branch approach to governance, nor 
do they assume the protections of built-in checks and balances between 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches.28  Instead, executive, legislative, 
and judicial functions may be collapsed into executive branch bodies.29  These 
tribunals’ functions may be subject to vigorous discussion from within 
 
243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 2:02-CV-439) [hereinafter Declaration of Michael H. 
Mobbs], available at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/hamdimobbs2.pdf. 
 25. I focus on function as an adaptive design feature.  In this case, the adaptation is 
undertaken by executive branch officials (largely political appointees, meaning those who hold 
office temporarily, rather than over the course of a civil service career, by virtue of appointment 
by elected officials), redesigning some small portion of an executive branch agency and personnel 
to new functions or functions normally reserved under the U.S. Constitution for other branches of 
government.  The core function that I identify is the common function of “sorting.”  Their job, as 
I discuss in subsequent text, is to sort detainees. 
 26. President’s National Archives Speech, supra note 1. 
 27. For the purposes of this Article, it is taken as a truism that Saddam Hussein, late 
President of Iraq, was not an ally of al Qaeda. 
 28. Louis Fisher, Military Commissions: Problems of Authority and Practice, 24 B.U. INT’L 
L.J. 15, 16 (2006). 
 29. Id. 
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different offices of the executive branch (reflecting the Obama 
Administration’s position that “due process” does not demand “judicial 
process”),30 but they largely do not face checks from other branches of power.  
(There are exceptions in which the judicial branch has checked exercises of 
executive power in executive branch tribunals—for example, federal judicial 
holdings in regard to the formal military commissions).31 
The foregoing section briefly outlined the inadequacy of our 
conceptualization of tribunals, framed around formally constituted military 
commission proceedings and proposed an expanded consideration of tribunals.  
The next section describes some of the functions that tribunals serve at 
different phases of various forms of detention in actual practice by the 
executive branch. 
II.  ACTUAL PRACTICE OF U.S. TRIBUNALS IN THE PRESENT CONFLICT 
This Part explores the functions of tribunals employed by U.S. executive 
branch practitioners in the war against al Qaeda and allied forces since 
September 2001.  In this discussion, I seek to explore answers to the 
underlying question: What role do tribunals play in the function of detention?  
My understanding of detention and the role of tribunals in it is informed by 
French social scientist Arnold van Gennep’s analysis of rites de passage.32  
The first and last phases “detach ritual subjects from their old places in society 
and return them, inwardly transformed and outwardly changed.”33  The middle, 
or liminal, phase (taking its name from the Latin term “limen,” literally 
meaning a “threshold”)34 by definition is located between established politico-
jural states.35  As an illustration, consider ordinary criminal procedure as a 
right of passage: a crime occurs (or is alleged to have occurred); an 
investigation identifies suspects; an accusation turns “a suspect” into “an 
 
 30. Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Address at Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 
5, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html. 
 31. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006) (holding that military 
commissions established by President Bush for trial of detainees held at Guantánamo “lack[] [the] 
power to proceed because its structure and procedures violate both the UCMJ and the Geneva 
Conventions”), superseded by statute, Military Commission Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 
120 Stat. 2600. 
 32. ARNOLD VAN GENNEP, THE RITES OF PASSAGE 2–3, 11 (Monika B. Vizedom & 
Gabrielle L. Caffee trans., 1960).  By rite de passage, van Gennep meant a ritual process that 
accompanies change of place, state, and social position (such as a wedding, funeral, or, I add, 
trial).  Id.  For Victor Turner’s influential interpretation of van Gennep’s work, see also VICTOR 
TURNER, BLAZING THE TRAIL: WAY MARKS IN THE EXPLORATION OF SYMBOLS 48–49, 132–33 
(Edith Turner ed., 1992). 
 33. TURNER, supra note 32, at 48–49. 
 34. Id. at 49, 132. 
 35. Id. at 49. 
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accused”; a trial turns “an accused” into a person adjudged guilty or not guilty.  
Accusation casts a person into the liminal state and verdict at trial ends the 
liminal state, returning the person to a stable social status associated with the 
verdict of either guilty or not guilty. 
A. Tribunals and the Initiation of Detention 
What roles do tribunals play in the liminal state of detention?  First, in 
every category of detention that I am considering in this Article—criminal, 
preventive, or interrogative detention—initiation of the liminal state is 
triggered by a tribunal.  We see from the evidence we have in battlefield 
memoirs, press reports, fact statements from pleadings in habeas cases, that 
initiation is by tribunal,36 if we consider a tribunal under the expanded 
functional definition I propose.  A group of executive branch employees, 
normally either in a military or intelligence capacity, is convened—to work 
either simultaneously in person, or to work consecutively by drafting and 
signing off on memos—to decide to subject a person to detention.37 
B. Tribunals and the Termination of Detention 
Thus, tribunals initiate the liminal state of detention, detaching the liminal 
subject from a stable state.  Do they play any further role?  The answer to this 
question depends on which kind of detention is at issue.  Considering criminal 
detention first, look at the goals: criminal detention is practiced in order to 
bring someone to trial.  The moment of accusation casts a suspect into a 
liminal state, which a trial verdict terminates.  Military commissions serve the 
function of providing the exit process from the liminal state of detention, for 
ending the limbo, by rendering a verdict of “guilty” or “not guilty.” 
Because of belief in a certain process (adversarial trial) for the production 
of truth (held even by those unsympathetic to detainees in U.S. custody), the 
emphasis by civil liberties advocates in the U.S. legal community on fair 
trials38 was not misguided per se.  It was, however, aimed at a set of 
 
 36. A military screening team, such as the one that selected U.S. citizen Yaser Hamdi for 
detention, acted as a “tribunal” by classifying Hamdi as an enemy combatant and determining his 
status.  Declaration of Michael H. Mobbs, supra note 24.  See generally, JONATHAN MAHLER, 
THE CHALLENGE: HOW A MAVERICK NAVY OFFICER AND A YOUNG LAW PROFESSOR RISKED 
THEIR CAREERS TO DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION—AND WON (2009) (describing the work of U.S. 
military screening teams as they select detainees from among those offered by Northern Alliance 
field commanders, prison operators, and bounty hunters). 
 37. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 948d (2006) (providing that the jurisdiction of military 
commissions includes both the determination that a person is an unlawful enemy combatant and 
whether such person violated the law). 
 38. See Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Comment, Military Tribunals and Legal 
Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261, 284 (2002) (noting 
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protections that would only serve a small fraction of U.S. detainees, only those 
intended for trial. 
C. Tribunals and Preventive Detention 
Military commissions, providing a clear exit to the liminal state of criminal 
detention, have proved to be the road less travelled, as described in Part I.  In 
contrast to those held for criminal detention, some detainees were treated more 
like traditional war detainees, wherein detention is aimed at getting combatants 
off the battlefield, meant to render a combatant hors de combat. I term this 
form of detention “preventive detention.”39  This is allowed, even encouraged, 
under the international law of war.40 
The law of armed conflict (also referred to as the law of war, or 
international humanitarian law) recognizes two kinds of conflicts: international 
armed conflicts, meaning those conflicts between states,41 and non-
international armed conflicts, between a state and a non-state actor (or between 
non-state actors).42  The last ten years’ hostilities have encompassed both of 
 
the commitment of the legal world to a high degree of civil liberties over the past sixty years and 
discussing the evolution of civil liberties in wartime). 
 39. The Obama Administration has referred to this as “law of war detention.”  See, e.g., 
Exec. Order No. 13,567, supra note 23, § 1(a). 
 40. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 31ST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE RED 
CROSS AND RED CRESCENT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF 
CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 16–17 (2011) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW], available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-move 
ment/31st-international-conference/31-int-conference-ihl-challenges-report-11-5-1-2-en.pdf 
(noting that it is “generally uncontroversial” that a detaining state detain a POW without any type 
of review “as long as active hostilities are ongoing, because enemy combatant status denotes that 
a person is ipso facto a security threat”). 
 41. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), arts. 1(4), 96(3), June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.  Pursuant to Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 
legal category of “international armed conflict” applies to all cases of declared war or to “any 
other armed conflict which may arise” between two or more states party to the Geneva 
Conventions even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.  Geneva Convention for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 2, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 
[hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third 
Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva 
Convention]. 
 42. First Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 3; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 
41, art. 3; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 3; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 
41, art. 3.  For an expert opinion on what counts as “armed conflict” under international law of 
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these forms.43  International law would categorize the U.S.’s war against Iraq 
as an international armed conflict, pitting forces of the government of the 
United States against forces of an Iraqi government headed by the late 
President Saddam Hussein.44  The consensus among the international legal 
community is that in Afghanistan, the United States and the International 
Security Assistance Force (“ISAF”) of its NATO allies are engaged in non-
international armed conflict.45  There is a lack of consensus regarding 
hostilities the United States is conducting elsewhere in the name of defeating al 
Qaeda.  What’s at stake in this distinction?  If non-international armed conflict 
can transcend borders, then U.S. lethal drone attacks in Yemen, for example, 
are incident to the war in Afghanistan and are a lawful use of force under 
international law.46  If not, then U.S. drone attacks are murder and 
assassination and, therefore, are unlawful.  The U.S. government in fact asserts 
the former.47  Other governments and legal experts reject that assertion, 
however, and consider hostilities outside the territory of Afghanistan to be 
beyond the scope of that conflict, outside of any category of hostilities allowed 
under or regulated by international law of war.48 
 
war, see Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, How Is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in 
International Humanitarian Law? (Mar. 17, 2008), available at  http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/ 
files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf. 
 43. See Derek Jinks, The Temporal Scope of Application of International Humanitarian Law 
in Contemporary Conflicts, PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POL’Y AND CONFLICT RES. 4, 8 (June 
2004), http:www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/Session3.pdf. 
 44. See Yoram Dinstein, Concluding Observations: The Influence of the Conflict in Iraq on 
International Law, in 86 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES, THE WAR IN IRAQ: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 
479, 481 (Raul A. Pedrozo ed., 2010). 
 45. For an authoritative U.S. legal opinion on the categorization of the Afghanistan 
hostilities, see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630–32 (2006), superseded by statute, 
Military Commission Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.  For representative views 
of the international community, see INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 40, at 10. 
 46. Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, in 
LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM 346, 357–59 (Benjamin Wittes 
ed., 2009). 
 47. See, e.g., Harold Hongjuh Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Keynote Speech at 
the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: The Obama Administration 
and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/ 
139119.htm (“[A] state that is engaged in an armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense is not 
required to provide targets with legal process before the state may use lethal force. . . .  [U]nder 
domestic law, the use of lawful weapons systems—consistent with the applicable laws of war—
for precision targeting of specific high-level belligerent leaders when acting in self-defense or 
during an armed conflict is not unlawful, and hence does not constitute ‘assassination.’”). 
 48. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 40, at 22 (“Pursuant to other views, 
which the ICRC shares, the notion that a person ‘carries’ a NIAC [non-international armed 
conflict] with him to the territory of a non-belligerent state should not be accepted.”). 
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1. International Armed Conflict 
These categorizations set the legal parameters for the tribunals that deal 
with detainees.  In an international armed conflict, a POW49 may legally be 
interned50 and the “detaining state is not obliged to provide [judicial] 
review . . . of POW internment as long as active hostilities are ongoing, 
because enemy combatant status denotes that a person is ipso facto a security 
threat.”51  Civilians may be interned “only if the security of the Detaining 
Power makes it absolutely necessary.”52  Unlike POWs or civilian combatants, 
an interned civilian has the right to challenge her detention before a court or 
tribunal and to automatic review of the need for her continued detention at 
least twice per year.53  Whether soldier, insurgent, or civilian, under 
international law, a person’s detention ends with combat hostilities.54  This is 
true even if insurgency survives state-to-state combat.55 
 
 49. Any member of opposing forces that surrenders or is captured is classified as a prisoner 
of war.  See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 4 (defining prisoners of war in an 
international armed conflict). 
 50. The facility in which a POW is held can be a closed-perimeter camp.  Id. art. 21.  The 
facility may not, however, be a penitentiary.  Id. art. 22.  The United States, like other states party 
to the Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, has bound itself 
to guarantee certain conditions of food, medical services, clothing, and sanitation in facilities in 
which it interns POWs.  Id. arts. 25–38.  Treatment of a prisoner of war is also governed by the 
minimum standard guarantees of Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.  
See First Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 3; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 41, 
art. 3; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 3; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 41, 
art. 3.  In addition to treaty law, U.S. statutory law codified standards for treatment of prisoners of 
war in legislation passed in 1996.  War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)–(d) (2006). 
 51.  INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 40, at 17. 
 52. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 42.  International legal experts consider it 
uncontroversial that civilians who directly participate in hostilities—such as some of the 
“insurgents” in Iraq who were not members of the regular Iraqi military—fall into the category of 
posing an immediate threat and may, under the law of war, be detained.  INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 40, at 17.  Other civilians, non-combatants, may in narrowly 
construed circumstances also legally be subject to “assigned residence” or internment.  Id. 
 53. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 43 (“Any protected person who has been 
interned or placed in assigned residence shall be entitled to have such action reconsidered as soon 
as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board designated by the Detaining Power for 
that purpose.  If the internment or placing in assigned residence is maintained, the court or 
administrative board shall periodically, and at least twice yearly, give consideration to his or her 
case, with a view to the favourable amendment of the initial decision, if circumstances permit.”). 
 54. See, e.g., Third Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 118 (“Prisoners of war shall be 
released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”); Fourth Geneva 
Convention, supra note 41, art. 46 (internment of civilians must cease as soon as the reasons that 
necessitated it no longer exist, and in any event must end “as soon as possible after the close of 
hostilities”). 
 55. Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, 2011-LIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 789, 847–48, available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=887954&portal=hbkm&so
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2. Non-international Armed Conflict 
By contrast with the very clear guarantees made in regard to detainees in 
international armed conflicts, international law is less specific in regard to 
requirements for tribunals and review of detention during hostilities 
categorized as non-international armed conflict.  A fighter for a non-state actor 
against a state is not considered a “lawful enemy combatant,” and if detained, 
is not considered a POW.56  How should such a detainee be treated? 
Although the Geneva Conventions’ Common Article 3 guarantees 
minimum standards for material conditions of detention and for detainee 
treatment whether the conflict is an international armed conflict or not,57 it 
does not provide any procedural guarantees of a court or tribunal to review the 
 
urce=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 (holding a 
state could not hold combatants in preventive detention after state-to-state hostilities had ceased, 
even if an insurgency still raged). 
 56. See INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 40, at 16 (“POWs are essentially 
combatants captured by the adverse party in an IAC [international armed conflict].”). 
 57. Common Article 3 provides: 
  In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound 
to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces 
who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, 
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without 
any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, 
or any other similar criteria. 
 To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in 
any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. 
 An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. 
 The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of 
special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. 
 The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the 
Parties to the conflict. 
First Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 3; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 3; 
Third, Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 3; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 
3. 
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detention of a combatant or a non-combatant.58  Likewise, it does not provide a 
way for a person to challenge their categorization as a threat, terrorist, or 
accomplice, nor does it supply any other procedural safeguards for persons 
detained in a non-international armed conflict.59  Additional Protocol II to the 
Geneva Conventions explicitly provides guidance for treatment of those in 
detention and internment60 (thus implicitly confirming that deprivation of 
liberty is acceptable practice during a non-international armed conflict), but 
like Common Article 3, it fails to list legally acceptable grounds for internment 
or other procedural rights of detainees.61 
While these important limits are all not specified under existing 
international law, international law is clear on the maximum possible length of 
legal detention, holding a uniform standard for international and non-
international armed conflicts.  Detention or internment, whether of a civilian or 
a combatant, ends when hostilities end.62 
3. What’s New, and Why It’s a Problem 
What makes matters most complicated here is the potential for indefinite 
detention, something not normally foreseen under the international law of war 
regulating preventive detention.  In a typical international armed conflict, war, 
as a formal legal state, has a clear beginning with a state’s declaration of war 
and a clear end with its offer or acceptance of surrender.  The current hostilities 
against al Qaeda and its allies, however, are different.  The U.S. government’s 
operating assumption was that hostilities could continue indefinitely, and 
 
 58. See Ashley S. Deeks, Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict, 40 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 403, 413 (2009). 
 59. Gabor Rona, An Appraisal of US Practice Relating to ‘Enemy Combatants,’ in 10 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 232, 241 (Timothy L.H. McCormack & 
Jann K. Kleffner eds., 2007). 
 60. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 5, June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
 61. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 40, at 17. 
 62. See, e.g., Third Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 118 (providing that, in an 
international armed conflict, a prisoner of war “shall be released and repatriated without delay 
after the cessation of active hostilities”); Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 46 
(stating that internment of civilians in a non-international armed conflict must cease “as soon as 
possible after the close of hostilities”); Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land, art. 20, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803 (requiring release of detainees as 
soon as possible after “the conclusion of peace”); Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land, art. 20, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 (“After the conclusion of 
peace, the repatriation of prisoners of war shall be carried out as quickly as possible.”); see also 
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 41, arts. 85, 99, 129. 
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therefore its legal position was that preventive detention could continue 
indefinitely.63  The liminal state, the limbo status, could extend into perpetuity. 
The possibility of the U.S. government practicing indefinite detention was 
even recognized by the Supreme Court in what might be considered the limit 
case of restraints on executive power to detain; the case of the U.S. 
government holding an American citizen without charge.64  Hamdi requires a 
few procedural guarantees to an American citizen detained pursuant to 
hostilities conducted under the auspices of Congress’s 2001 Authorization for 
the Use of Military Force.65  Those guarantees are: that the government 
provide an American citizen detainee with notice of a categorization (like 
“enemy combatant”) upon which detention is based; that the government 
provide an American citizen detainee the chance to rebut that categorization; 
and that the government provide a “neutral decision maker” before which an 
American citizen detainee can challenge the categorization that serves as the 
basis for his detention.66  (The “neutral decision-maker” does not have to be an 
official of the judicial branch nor a formally constituted body like a court-
martial.67  Supreme Court jurisprudence thus confirms a wider understanding 
of tribunal beyond the judiciary or the formally constituted.) 
The reality for non-Americans is bleaker.  The admittedly cold comfort of 
Hamdi’s procedural safeguards, providing the parameters under which a 
detainee may challenge his categorization as an enemy combatant, extend only 
to the very small category of American citizens held in preventive detention in 
the war.68  Informal tribunals in such situations play an even more important 
role.  For non-Americans held at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Station, the 
Obama Administration instituted a system of PRBs to conduct an “initial 
review” of the information relevant to determining whether each detainee’s 
detention is “necessary to protect against a significant threat to the security of 
 
 63. Waxman, supra note 3, at 344 (quoting U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of 
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, Second Periodic Reports 
of States Parties Due in 1999, Addendum (United States of America) Annex 1, at 47, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/48/Add.3 (May 6, 2005), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/441182 
dc0.pdf). 
 64. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518–21 (2004) (recognizing potentially indefinite 
detention under the executive branch’s authority to detain enemy combatants captured in 
Afghanistan pursuant to the Congressional Authorization for the Use of Military Force), 
superseded by statute, Military Commission Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. 
 65. Id. at 521, 533.  See generally Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”), 
Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)) (defining the 
scope of hostilities broadly). 
 66. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533. 
 67. See id. at 538. 
 68. See id. at 509 (stating that the Court’s holding only applies to American citizen detainees 
held in the United States). 
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the United States.”69  At the initial review, each detainee may introduce 
additional or mitigating information relevant to determining whether the facts 
of their case warrant continued preventive detention.70  The procedures for the 
initial review at times fail to make sense under the rationale of criminal 
procedure in an adversarial process.  For example, the Secretary of Defense, in 
coordination with intelligence and other agencies, shall compile all 
information relevant to the determination of whether the standard for continued 
detention has been met.71  In other words, the process relies on the 
“prosecution” to gather and submit evidence that could exculpate the 
“defendant.”  While this looks counter-intuitive from the perspective of 
criminal law, in which the prosecution’s goal is to convict, it makes more sense 
in the national security domain, in which the goal is to accurately assess a 
threat and protect the United States as efficiently as possible.  That would 
mean the “prosecution’s” goal is to release any detainee whose continued 
detention does not protect against a significant threat to U.S. national security. 
In any event, Guantánamo detainees should make the most of their initial 
review hearings: if the PRB finds that their continued preventive detention 
meets the standard of protecting the United States against a significant threat, 
each detainee is thereafter entitled only to a biannual file review and a triennial 
full review and PRB hearing.72 
Thanks to the Obama Administration’s formulation of procedures for 
review and publication of those procedures in open-access sources, we have 
some information about the rules regulating the informal tribunals that review 
the continued preventive detention of those held at the Guantánamo Bay 
facility.  We have far less information about the procedures for review of 
continued preventive detention of those held at the Bagram facility in 
Afghanistan, in which the United States holds many more detainees.73  Most of 
the little public information we have comes from court filings in habeas actions 
brought by Bagram detainees,74 although the Obama Administration has 
recently sought to shed more light on these procedures.75  Each individual 
 
 69. Exec. Order No. 13,567, supra note 23, §§ 2–3(a). 
 70. Id. § 3(a). 
 71. Id. § 3(a)(4). 
 72. Id. § 3(b)–(c).  The twice-per-year regularity meets the standard that the Fourth Geneva 
Convention sets out for review of continued internment of a civilian during armed conflict.  
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 78. 
 73. See Waxman, supra note 3, at 344, 350; see also supra notes 18–19 and accompanying 
text. 
 74. See Waxman, supra note 3, at 350.  Procedures described are those used after 2006; 
those used before are even less publicized and more murky. 
 75. See, e.g., William Lietzau, U.S. Deputy Assistant Sec’y of Def. for Rule of Law & 
Detainee Policy, Address at the London School of Economics and Political Science Department 
of Law: Detention of Terrorists in 21st Century Armed Conflict (May 3, 2012). 
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brought to theater detention facilities for long-term confinement has his case 
reviewed by an Enemy Combatant Review Board, a five-officer panel that 
recommends by majority vote whether the detainee be held in continued 
detention.76  We can infer that each person’s continued detention is reviewed 
once every six months because Waxman, formerly a Bush Administration 
Department of Defense official with some purview over detainee affairs, goes 
on to write: 
Although the US government maintains that the Fourth Geneva Convention is 
inapplicable as a matter of law to Afghanistan detainees because that 
Convention applies to civilians, not combatants, the processes US forces 
eventually put in place roughly track the requirements of [the Fourth Geneva 
Convention] Article 78, which calls for, among other things, regular processes 
and periodic review (at least every six months) for security internees.77 
D. Tribunals and Interrogative Detention 
Criminal prosecution and prevention are only two of the factors motivating 
U.S. practices of detention in the “war on terror.”  The U.S. government and its 
allies detained others as the equivalent of witnesses, detained for what they 
might know.78  Intelligence analysts now construct a picture of the threat 
environment, as one court described, by fitting “[t]housands of bits and pieces 
of seemingly innocuous information . . . into place to reveal with startling 
clarity how the unseen whole must operate.”79  With the mosaic theory of 
intelligence,80 detainees might not even know that they know something 
useful.  Some detainees who may be useful in this context have been held for 
 
 76. Waxman, supra note 3, at 350 (citing Declaration of Colonel James W. Gray ¶¶ 11–13, 
Al Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 06-CV-01669 (JDB) (D.D.C. Mar. 3, 2007) (discussing review process 
for detainees in Afghanistan); Declaration of Colonel Rose M. Miller ¶¶ 10–12, Ruzatullah v. 
Rumsfeld, No. 06-C-01707 (GK) (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2006) (discussing detention procedures and 
review process for enemy combatants detained in Afghanistan)). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See FIONA DE LONDRAS, DETENTION IN THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’: CAN HUMAN RIGHTS 
FIGHT BACK? 2–3 (2011) (noting the “models of . . . interrogative detention introduced in the US 
and the UK primarily—although not exclusively—under the leadership of George W. Bush and 
Tony Blair” during the “War on Terror”). 
 79. Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 80. N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 219–20 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing the 
“information mosaic” as a reason for judicial deference); Halkin, 598 F.2d at 8 (likening foreign 
intelligence gathering in an age of computer technology to the construction of a mosaic).  The 
Department of the Navy, in its Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) regulations, thus defines 
the theory as “[t]he concept that apparently harmless pieces of information when assembled 
together could reveal a damaging picture.”  32 C.F.R. § 701.31 (2011).  For a discussion of the 
mosaic theory of intelligence and its role in FOIA jurisprudence, see generally David E. Pozen, 
Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 
628 (2005). 
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questioning, even if they are not criminal suspects.  Those doing the holding 
are practicing interrogative detention. 
States may have an even greater incentive to practice interrogative 
detention against a non-state global adversary, such as the one the United 
States has confronted in the present conflict, than they had in previous wars.  
Unlike a traditional international armed conflict between states, the adversary 
does not sit in a capital, with an intelligence headquarters, National Security 
Council, or Politburo.  There are no intelligence headquarters to bug, no one 
set of battle-plan blueprints to photograph.  The intelligence “headquarters” of 
an adversary like al Qaeda might be a laptop.  When facing a flexible and fluid 
adversary, human sources of information about the networks, redundancies, 
motivations, and strategies become even more significant for discerning the 
enemy. 
Against this background of heightened demand for interrogative detention, 
I propose that the U.S. legal and human rights community pinned false hopes 
on criminal procedure.  Early efforts focused on securing federal jurisdiction 
over Guantánamo detainees, and then the writ of habeas corpus for 
Guantánamo detainees.81  Later, U.S. lawyers worked on securing due process 
for those detainees referred to the Guantánamo Military Commission for trial.82  
These efforts, involving hundreds of volunteers and hundreds of thousands of 
pro bono hours over dozens of lawsuits, scored many successes.83 
Why then do I refer to the emphasis on securing domestic criminal 
procedure guarantees for detainees as a pursuit of false hopes?  Because many 
detainees likely were kept for purposes of prevention or interrogation, not 
trial.84  A lawsuit securing criminal procedure guarantees for a detainee or 
category of detainees, such as barring information obtained by torture from 
admission into evidence at trial, will shape the treatment of those in criminal 
detention.  However, such guarantees are meaningless if the government never 
intends to try a detainee, or if the government never suspects nor accuses the 
detainee of an act already committed or a conspiracy already formulated. 
I have proposed that U.S. executive branch tribunals have operated in 
different phases of three different detention contexts in the hostilities against al 
Qaeda over the last ten years: criminal detention, preventive detention, and 
interrogative detention.  While U.S. civil libertarians focused on securing 
habeas rights and criminal procedure protections for detainees, those efforts 
failed to address the legal justification and national security rationale 
 
 81. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text. 
 82. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 83. See supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text. 
 84. See President’s National Archives Speech, supra note 1 (emphasizing that any detainees 
who might endanger Americans would not be released). 
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motivating interrogative and preventive detention.85  Thus, efforts to reform 
criminal procedure for detainees were germane only to tribunals working with 
a small minority of the detainees the U.S. government held.  Evidentiary 
battles and criminal procedure victories would not regulate tribunals that were 
never intended to conduct trials.  I argue that the last ten years of executive 
branch conduct has shown demonstrable gaps in international law and 
domestic regulation of tribunals operating outside of the end phase of the 
criminal detention context.  In the next section, I propose ways to address this 
gap. 
III.  PROPOSALS 
A. Tribunals in Criminal Detention 
Regarding those concerned about processing detainees held for criminal 
detention, I would remind them that we have a robust set of alternative 
tribunals.  Violations of U.S. criminal law can be tried in U.S. civilian courts.  
Deliberations in Congress over a Senate proposal automatically to preclude 
foreign terrorists’ prosecution in U.S.-based civilian courts86 runs directly 
counter to the intention of the Bush Administration when President Bush 
originally authorized military commissions for terrorist suspects in November 
2001.87  The Administration’s representative in the December 4, 2001 hearings 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Military Commissions stated the 
Administration’s position was, clearly, to add and not subtract prosecution 
options for the executive branch.88 
 
 85. See President’s National Archives Speech, supra note 1; supra notes 6–10, 39–40, 78–80 
and accompanying text. 
 86. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, S. 1867, 112th Cong. § 1032 
(as passed by Senate, Dec. 1, 2011). 
 87. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism § 1(e)–(f), 3 C.F.R. 918, 918 (2001), reprinted in 10 
U.S.C. § 801 (2006). 
 88. Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against 
Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 144 (2001) (statements of 
Sen. Jeff Sessions, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary & Hon. Pierre-Richard Prosper, 
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues). 
  Senator SESSIONS. . . . If he [the President] thought a trial could be tried in civil 
district court, he could allow it to go there?  Or he could send it to a military tribunal?  Is 
that your understanding of the Order [the Executive Order authorizing military 
commissions]? 
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In addition to trying suspects in U.S. federal court, violations of martial 
law and laws of war can be tried in courts-martial, a venue in which Congress 
prescribes the substantive law but the executive itself establishes procedure.89  
Courts-martial show both the limits of a two-branch system of government 
(wherein executive branch employees staff both the prosecution, the defense, 
the jury pool, and the judiciary—and in some cases face informal pressures to 
indict or not, convict or not, sentence harshly or leniently)90 and the triumphs 
of an ethic of zealous advocacy.  If for some reason the federal courts and the 
courts-martial are found to be inadequate, an administration can set up military 
commissions to try violations of laws of war.91  The last ten years’ experience 
shows that military commissions may, however, be a costly and time-
consuming alternative whose advantages to existing tribunals are not obvious 
and whose utility should be considered with a skeptical eye.  Finally, U.S. legal 
experts and authorities would be advised to consider under what circumstances 
the United States could benefit from adjudication by an international tribunal 
and invest in the development of such a tribunal ahead of time. 
B. Tribunals in Preventive Detention 
My proposal regarding those held in preventive detention in the present 
conflict follows the undisputed precedent of international law for international 
armed conflict.  At the end of active combat hostilities against al Qaeda, the 
United States and its allies should release all of those remaining in preventive 
detention or charge detainees with war crimes and try them.92  To be specific, 
detainees held in Guantánamo, each of whose case has been reviewed by an 
Obama Administration tribunal since 2009, should either be released or 
charged and tried when the Administration ends hostilities in the theater in 
which the detainee was taken into custody.  For most, that means when the war 
in Afghanistan ends, they should be tried and if found guilty, incarcerated and 
if not, released.  Detainees that the United States is holding in preventive 
detention in Bagram facilities in Afghanistan should likewise be formally 
 
  Ambassador PROSPER.  That is absolutely correct, and I think, again, one thing that 
I would like to highlight here is what the President has done is created an option.  He has 
not ruled out the Federal courts or the Article III courts.  He is creating an option.  So at 
the time that a particular case comes to his desk, he will balance the interests of the 
country and make the appropriate decision at that time. 
Id. 
 89. See 10 U.S.C. § 817 (2006). 
 90. See id. §§ 825(a)–(c), 826(a), 827(b). 
 91. See id. § 948b(b). 
 92. See War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006); Third Geneva Convention, supra 
note 41, art. 118 (providing that, in an international armed conflict, a prisoner of war “shall be 
released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”). 
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charged with crimes and tried before an international or Afghan tribunal or 
released when hostilities the United States is conducting there cease. 
In preparation for future conflicts, effort should be made to examine the 
existing laws of war for international armed conflict in order to identify those 
areas in which those laws do not work for non-international armed conflict.  
U.S. lawyers should also use their experience of the present conflict to 
examine the limitations of habeas jurisprudence.  The U.S. government should 
publicize the criteria and procedures of tribunals like the PRBs, both in the 
interest of the accountability that transparency brings and in the interest of 
making procedures and decisions open to suggestion. 
C. Tribunals in  Interrogative Detention 
Tribunals work at several points in interrogative detention.  The initial 
screening or sorting of detainees for interrogation often happens on the fly, in 
combat or afterwards.93  Mass “sweeps” of civilians to hold for interrogation 
violates the international legal principle of distinction (which limits attacks to 
military objects and which should be analogized to inform military activities 
beyond attacks) and proportionality (which prohibits military actions which 
might be excessive in relation to the military advantage gained).94  From the 
point of view of the detaining power, moreover, too many sources of less 
relevant information actually may harm intelligence and military efforts.  If the 
United States government intends to practice interrogative detention in future 
conflicts—a conclusion it need not reach—at least it should systematically 
examine recent experience and formulate guidelines for the intake, seizure, and 
battlefield screening of the kind that has taken place in this conflict on such a 
wide scale. 
Finally, the United States also needs to evaluate the procedures and 
practices used to review the continued detention of those held for questioning.  
We need to establish procedures for tribunals to review those kept for 
interrogative detention in order continually to ascertain if the information a 
given person may have had has passed its shelf-life, and if so, release the 
detainee. 
CONCLUSION 
It is time for the U.S. legal community to grapple with the challenges 
posed by all tribunals that have operated in the “war on terror” with the same 
intense focus that has been brought to scrutinizing formally constituted 
tribunals like military commissions.  Over the past decade, informal tribunals, I 
 
 93. See, e.g., Declaration of Michael H. Mobbs, supra note 24, ¶¶ 4–6. 
 94. For discussion of these two principles and the United States’ commitment to them, see, 
for example, Koh, supra note 47, at 14–15. 
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have argued here, have assumed an importance unprecedented in U.S. 
experience of armed conflict because of structural features inherent to a 
conflict against non-state actors with global reach.  While the U.S. legal 
community has concentrated on the procedures that govern the formal trials 
that bring criminal detention to an end, I contend that in this conflict, the U.S. 
executive branch has mostly practiced detention for other reasons, most 
prominently preventive detention and interrogative detention.  The tribunals 
used in preventive and interrogative detention are overdue for the level of 
scrutiny that military commissions have garnered. 
The U.S. government under the Obama Administration initiated a review 
of its detention procedures.95  The Administration and the U.S. legal 
community should subject the range of tribunals used in this war to the same 
systematic scrutiny.  The goal should be to refine the law and standards that 
guide tribunal administrators’ work so that in the next war, tribunals may help 
achieve the bottom-line principle of the law of war—namely, to end hostilities 
as quickly and humanely as possible. 
 
 
 95. See Exec. Order No. 13,493, supra note 22. 
